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Abstract—Using public cloud for image storage has become
a prevalent trend with the rapidly increasing number of pictures generated by various devices. For example, today’s most
smartphones and tablets synchronize photo albums with cloud
storage platforms. However, as many images contain sensitive
information, such as personal identities and ﬁnancial data, it
is concerning to upload images to cloud storage. To eliminate
such privacy concerns in cloud storage while keeping decent data
management and search features, a spectrum of keywords-based
searchable encryption (SE) schemes have been proposed in the
past decade. Unfortunately, there is a fundamental gap remains
open for their support of images, i.e., appropriate keywords need
to be extracted for images before applying SE schemes to them.
On one hand, it is obviously impractical for smartphone users
to manually annotate their images. On the other hand, although
cloud storage services now offer image annotation services, they
rely on access to users’ unencrypted images. To fulﬁll this
gap and open the ﬁrst path from SE schemes to images, this
paper proposes a cloud assisted privacy-preserving automatic
image annotation scheme, namely CAPIA. CAPIA enables cloud
storage users to automatically assign keywords to their images
by leveraging the power of cloud computing. Meanwhile, CAPIA
prevents the cloud from learning the content of images and their
keywords. Thorough analysis is carried out to demonstrate the
security of CAPIA. A prototype implementation over the wellknown IAPR TC-12 dataset further validates the efﬁciency and
accuracy of CAPIA.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The widespread use of smartphones brings the explosive
growth in the number of pictures taken. According to a recent
report from Mylio [1], over one trillion pictures will be
taken by smartphones in 2017. To store and manage a large
number of images in an efﬁcient and economical way, public
cloud storage has been widely adopted by most smartphone
users. Currently, majority of smartphones are synchronizing
their photo albums with cloud storage services, including
Apple’s iCloud, Samsung Cloud, Google Photo, etc. Despite
the decent features offered by cloud storage services, directly
uploading images to public cloud also causes privacy breaches
and even legal issues. This is because many images contain
sensitive information, such as healthcare information, personal
identities/locations, and ﬁnancial information, etc. Nowadays,
encrypting images with standard encryption algorithms, such
as AES, is still the major approach for privacy protection in
c
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cloud storage [2], [3]. Nevertheless, these traditional encryption algorithms inevitability sacriﬁce the usability of images
outsourced to cloud, including efﬁcient indexing, search, keywords extractions, etc.
To protect the privacy of data stored on public cloud
while retaining the efﬁcient search ability over these data,
keywords-based searchable encryption (SE) has received a lot
of research effort in recent years [4]–[9]. A SE scheme typically provides encrypted search indexes constructed based on
proper keywords assigned to data ﬁles. With these encrypted
indexes, the data owner can submit encrypted keywordsbased-search request to search their data over ciphertexts. SE
schemes have been demonstrated to be effective for text ﬁles,
however, fundamental challenges remain for their support of
images. Speciﬁcally, unlike text ﬁles that support automatic
keyword extraction from their content or ﬁle names, keywords
assignment for an image relies on manual description, or
automatic annotation based on a large-scale pre-annotated
image dataset. From the perspective of user experience, manually annotating each image from users’ devices is clearly an
impractical choice. Meanwhile, automatic image annotation
involving large-scale image datasets is too resource consuming
to be developed on mobile terminals. Although cloud storage
services, such as Apple’s iCloud and Google Photo, are now
offering automatic image annotation to extract appropriate
keywords for images, access to unencrypted images is a necessary requirement. As a matter of fact, directly utilizing this
kind of annotation services contradicts the privacy protection
purpose in SE. Therefore, the key gap to fulﬁll between SE
schemes and images becomes how to automatically annotate
images in a privacy-preserving manner. Unfortunately, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no existing solution that can
efﬁciently and effectively achieve such a desired functionality.
In this paper, we propose the ﬁrst privacy-preserving image
annotation scheme (CAPIA) that can be securely delegated
to the public cloud. CAPIA provides efﬁcient annotation and
can be easily parallelized for cloud computing environment.
Meanwhile, CAPIA achieves comparable annotation accuracy
compared with existing no-privacy-preserving image annotation approaches. To securely support required operations
in automatic image annotation, we ﬁrst design two privacypreserving outsourcing schemes for L1 distance comparison
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and Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence comparison respectively as building blocks for CAPIA. Furthermore, as the
same keyword may have different importance for the semantic
description of different images, we design a real-time weight
to support accurate ﬁnal keywords selection in the image annotation process. To evaluate CAPIA, we ﬁrst conduct thorough
analysis for it in terms of security and efﬁciency. Then, we
provide an extensive experimental evaluation for CAPIA with
a prototype implementation over the well-known IAPR TC12 dataset [10]. Our evaluation results further validate the
practical performance of CAPIA in terms of efﬁciency and
accuracy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II: we present the system model and threat model of CAPIA.
Section III introduces backgrounds of automatic image annotation and technical preliminaries for CAPIA. The detailed
construction of CAPIA as well as its security analysis are
provided in Section IV. Section V evaluates the performance
of CAPIA. We review and discuss related works in Section
VI and conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. M ODELS
A. System Model
As shown in Fig.1, our CAPIA system is consistent with
today’s major cloud storage application, which consists of
two entities: a Cloud Server and a User. The user stores
his/her images on cloud, and the cloud helps the user to
annotate his/her images. Once the user obtains keywords for
his/her images, he/she can adopt existing SE schemes for
his/her images to achieve keywords-based privacy-preserving
image search. During the entire image storage and annotation
process, CAPIA prevents the cloud storage server from learning the privacy of the user’s images and their corresponding
keywords.
In CAPIA, the user ﬁrst performs a one-time preparation
for extracting features of images in a pre-annotated dataset,
and encrypts these features as well as keywords. These encrypted features and keywords will be outsourced to cloud to
assist future privacy-preserving image annotation. For resource
constrained mobile devices, this one-time setup process can
be performed using desktops. Later on, when the user has a
new image to annotate, he/she generates an encrypted request
and sends it to the cloud. After processing the request, the
cloud returns ciphertexts of top related keywords and auxiliary
information. Finally, the user decrypts all keywords and ranks
them based on their real-time weights to select ﬁnal keywords.

Fig. 1. System Model of CAPIA

B. Threat Model
In CAPIA, we consider the cloud server to be “curiousbut-honest”, i.e., the cloud server will follow our scheme to
perform storage and annotation services correctly, but it may
try to learn sensitive information in users’ data. The cloud
server has access to all encrypted images, encrypted image
features, encrypted keywords, the user’s request, and encrypted
annotation results. This assumption is consistent with majority
of existing works that focus on search over encrypted data
on public cloud [6]–[9]. In addition, the cloud may get some
ciphertexts-plaintexts pairs of the user’s images as well as their
corresponding features and keywords. For example, the cloud
may obtain a user’s image information by analyzing his/her
social media posts. CAPIA should protect a user’s privacy by
preventing the cloud from learning the following information:
1) content of the user’s images; 2) features extracted and
keywords annotated for each image; 3) request linkability, i.e.,
tell whether multiple annotation requests are from the same
image.
III. P RELIMINARIES
A. Image Feature Extraction
In this paper, we adopt global low-level image features as
that are utilized in the baseline image annotation technique
[11], because it can be applied to general images without
complex models and subsequent training. Color features of
an image are extracted in three different color spaces: RGB,
HSV, and LAB. In particular, RGB feature is computed as a
normalized 3D histogram of RGB pixel, in which each channel
(R,G,B) has 16 bins that divide the color space values from 0
to 255. The HSV and LAB features can be processed similarly
as RGB, and thus we can construct three feature vectors
for RGB, HSV and LAB respectively as VRGB , VHSV , and
VLAB . Texture features of an image are extracted using Gabor
and Haar wavelets. Speciﬁcally, an image is ﬁrst ﬁltered with
Gabor wavelets at three scales and four orientations, resulting
in twelve response images. Each response image is then
divided into non-overlappng rectangle blocks. Finally, mean
ﬁlter response magnitudes from each block over all response
images are concatenated into a feature vector, denoted as
VG . Meanwhile, a quantized Gabor feature of an image is
generated using the mean Gabor response phase angle in nonoverlapping blocks in each response image. These quantized
values are concatenated into a feature vector, denoted as VGQ .
The Haar feature of an image is extracted similarly as Gabor,
but based on differently conﬁgured Haar wavelets. HaarQ
stands for the quantized version of Haar feature, which quantizes Haar features into [0,-1,1] if the sign of Haar response
values are [zero, negative, positive], respectively. We denote
feature vectors of Haar and HaarQ as VH and VHQ respectively. Therefore, given an image, seven feature vectors will
be extracted as [VRGB , VHSV , VLAB , VG , VGQ , VH , VHQ ].
For more details about the adopted image feature extraction,
please refer to ref [11].
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B. Integer Vector Encryption (IVE)
In this section, we describe a homomorphic encryption
scheme designed for integer vectors [12], which will be tailored in our construction to achieve privacy-preserving image
annotation. For expression simplicity, following deﬁnitions
will be used in the rest of this paper
• For a vector V (or a matrix M), deﬁne |max(V)| (or
|max(M)|) to be the maximum absolute value of their
elements.
• For a ∈ R, deﬁne a to be the nearest integer of a, aq
to be the nearest integer of a with modulus q.
n×m
• For matrix M ∈ R
, deﬁne vec(M) to be a nmdimensional vector by concatenating the transpose of
each column of M.
Encryption: Given a m-dimensional vector V ∈ Zm
p and the
,
output
the
ciphertext
of V as
secret key matrix S ∈ Zm×m
q
C = S−1 (wV + e)T

(1)

−1

is the inverse matrix of S, T is the transpose
where S
operator, e is a random error vector, w is an integer parameter,
q >> p, w > 2|max(e)|.
Decryption: Given the ciphertext C, it can be decrypted using
T
S and w as V =  (SC)
w q .
Inner Product: Given two ciphertexts C1 , C2 of V1 , V2 , and
their corresponding secret keys S1 and S2 , the inner product
operation of V1 and V2 over ciphertexts can be performed as
vec(C1 CT2 )
q = wV1 VT2 + e
(2)
w
To this end, vec(ST1 S2 ) becomes the new secret key and
vec(C1 CT
2 )

q becomes the new ciphertext of V1 VT2 .
w
More details about this IVE encryption algorithm and its
security proof are available in ref [12].
vec(ST1 S2 )

IV. C LOUD A SSISTED P RIVACY- PRESERVING I MAGE
A NNOTATION
The core idea of automatic image annotation is built on
the hypothesis that images contain similar objects are likely
to share keywords. Hence, given a large-scale pre-annotated
image dataset, the annotation process for a new image can be
ﬁrst treated as a process of transferring keywords from images
that contains similar objects. In CAPIA, similarity of images
is measured by seven low-level color and texture feature
vectors [Vi,RGB , Vi,HSV , Vi,LAB , Vi,G , Vi,GQ , Vi,H , Vi,HQ ]
as discussed in Section III-A. Speciﬁcally, given two images
Ia ,Ib , their similarity can be computed as a combined distance
GQ
+ DL1HSV
+ DL1G
Disab =DL1RGB
ab
ab
ab + DL1ab

A. PL1C: Privacy-preserving L1 Distance Comparison
In PL1C, we consider a user has three m-dimensional
integer vectors Vi , i ∈ {a, b, c} that will be outsourced to
cloud after encryption. The cloud later compares L1 distances
DL1ac and DL1bc directly over ciphertexts to ﬁgure out which
one is smaller.
Data Preparation: Given a vector Vi = [vi1 , · · · , vim ], i ∈
{a, b, c}, the user converts it to a mβ-dimensional binary
vector Ṽi = [F (vi1 ), · · · , F (vim )], where β = |max(Vi )|,
and F (vij ) = [1, 1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0] such that the ﬁrst vij
terms are 1 and the rest β − vij terms are 0. The L1 distance
between Va and Vb now can be calculated as
m
mβ
DL1ab = j=1 |vaj − vbj | = j=1 (ṽaj − ṽbj )2
Then, the user adopts an approximation method introduced
in ref [13] to reduce the dimension of Ṽi from mβ to m̂ =
based on the Johnson Lindenstrauss (JL) Lemma
αm logβ+1
γ
[14]. By denoting
the approximated
mβ
m̂ vector as V̂i , we have
DL1ab = j=1 (ṽaj − ṽbj )2 ≈ j=1 (v̂aj − v̂bj )2 .
The correctness and accuracy of such an approximation
have been proved in ref [13]. According to our experimental
evaluation in Section V, we set α = 1 and γ = 100 in our
scheme to achieve balanced accuracy and efﬁciency.
Data Encryption: Given an approximated vector V̂i , i ∈
{a, b}, the user appends
m̂two 2 elements to it as V̂i =
[v̂i1 , v̂i2 , · · · , v̂im̂ , r − 21 j=1 v̂ij
, i ], where r is a random
number and i is a small random noise. Then, the user
encrypts V̂i using the Encryption algorithm of IVE presented
in Section III-B as
Ci = S−1 (wV̂i + ei )T

where S is the secret matrix, ei is an error vector, and w is an
integer parameter. Ca , Cb , and w are outsourced to the cloud.
Request Generation: Given the approximated vector V̂c ,
the user selects a positive random number rc and applies it to
V̂c as V̂c = [rc v̂c1 , · · · , rc v̂cm̂ , rc , 1]. V̂c is then encrypted as
T
Cc = S−1
c (w V̂c + ec ) , where Sc is the secret key generated
T
for V̂c . Cc and S Sc are sent to the cloud as request.
Distance Comparison: On receiving the request, the cloud
vec(Ca CT
vec(Cb CT
c )
c )
q , 
q , and decrypts them uscomputes 
w
w
T

T

ing vec(ST Sc ) to obtain V̂a V̂c and V̂b V̂c as Eq.2. Finally,
the approximated L1 distance comparison is performed as
T

T

V̂b V̂c − V̂a V̂c
= rc

m̂


v̂bj v̂cj −

j=1

HQ
LAB
+ DL1H
ab + DL1ab + DKLab

where DL1 and DKL denote L1 distance and KL-Divergence
of two vectors after data normalization. We consider these
seven basic distances contribute equally to the total combined
distance Disab . Based on this observation, we ﬁrst propose
two privacy-preserving distance comparison solutions for L1
(namely, PL1C) and KL-Divergence (namely, PKLC) respectively, which support two key operations in CAPIA.

(3)

− (rc

m̂

j=1

(4)
rc
2

v̂aj v̂cj −

m̂


2
v̂bj
+ rc r +  b

j=1

m̂
rc  2
v̂ + rc r + a )
2 j=1 aj

m̂
m̂

rc 
( (v̂aj − v̂cj )2 −
(v̂bj − v̂cj )2 ) + (b − a )
2 j=1
j=1
rc
≈ (DL1ac − DL1bc ) + (b − a )
2

=
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It is worth to note that PL1C is only interested in which
distance is smaller during the comparison. Therefore, instead
of letting the cloud get exact L1 distances for comparison,
PL1C adopts approximated distance comparison result scaled
and obfuscated by rc and b − a as shown in Eq.4. As rc is
a positive random number, the sign of r2c (DL1ac − DL1bc )
is consistent with DL1ac − DL1bc . Meanwhile, since rc >>
b − a , the added noise term has negligible inﬂuence to the
sign of DL1ac − DL1bc unless these two distances are very
close to each other. Fortunately, instead of ﬁnding the most
related one, our CAPIA design will utilize PL1C to ﬁgure out
top 10 related candidates during the comparison. Such a design
makes important candidates (say top 5 out of top 10) not be
bypassed by the error introduced in b − a . This hypothesis
is further validated by our experimental results in Section V.

using vec(ST Sc ) to get Va VTc and Vb VTc as Eq.2. Then, the
cloud compares DKLac and DKLbc by computing

=
−

Va VTc − Vb VTc
(7)
m
m


rc (r +
vaj × log(vaj ) −
vaj × log(vcj )) − a
rc (r +

j=1

j=1

m


m


j=1

=

vbj × log(vbj ) −

vbj × log(vcj )) + b

j=1

rc (DKLac − DKLbc ) + (b − a )

Similar to our PL1C construction, we have rc > 0 and
rc >> (b − a ). Therefore, the cloud can ﬁgure out which
KL-Divergence is smaller based on the scaled and obfuscated
comparison result.
C. Detailed Construction of CAPIA

B. PKLC: Privacy-preserving KL-Divergence Comparison
In PKLC, we consider a user has three m-dimensional vectors Vi , i ∈ {a, b, c}, and wants to outsource the comparison
of DKLac and DKLbc to the cloud without disclosing the
content of Vi , i ∈ {a, b, c}. The deﬁnition of KL-Divergence
for two vectors Va , Vb is:
=

DKLab

=

m

j=1
m

j=1

vaj × log(

vaj
)
vbj

vaj × log(vaj ) −

(5)
m


vaj × log(vbj )

j=1

v

) = log(vaj ) = log(vbj ) = 0 if vaj = 0 or
where log( vaj
bj
vbj = 0.
Data Encryption: The user ﬁrst appends m + 2 elements to Vi , i ∈ {a, b} as Vi = [vi1 , vi2 , · · · , vim , vi1 ×
log(vi1 ), · · · , vim × log(vim ), r, i ], where r is a random
number and i is a small random noise. Then, Vi , i ∈ {a, b}
are encrypted with the Encryption algorithm of IVE as
Ci = S−1 (wVi + ei )T

(6)

Ca and Cb are outsourced to the cloud.
Request Generation: The user processes Vc to generate a
privacy-preserving KL-Divergence comparison request as
•

•

Replace elements vcj with −rc × log(vcj ), and append
m+2 elements to Vc as Vc = [−rc ×log(vc1 ), · · · , −rc ×
log(v
 cm ), G(vc1 ), · · · , G(vcm ), rc , −1], where G(vcj ) =
rc , vcj = 0
, rc is a positive random number changing
0, vcj = 0
for every request.
Encrypt Vc as Cc using the Encryption algorithm of IVE
T
as Cc = S−1
c (wVc + ec ) .

Cc and ST Sc are sent to the cloud as request.
Distance Comparison: On receiving the request, the cloud
vec(Ca CT
vec(Cb CT
c )
c )
ﬁrst computes 
q , 
q and decrypts them
w
w

CAPIA consists of ﬁve major procedures. In the System
Setup, the user selects system parameters, extracts and preprocesses feature vectors of images in a pre-annotated dataset.
Then, the user executes the Data Encryption procedure to
encrypt these processed feature vectors. Both the System Setup
procedure and the Data Encryption procedure are one-time
cost in CAPIA. Later on, the user can use the Secure Annotation Request procedure to generate an encrypted annotation
request. On receiving the request, the cloud server performs the
Privacy-preserving Annotation on Cloud procedure to return
encrypted keywords for the requested image. At the end, the
user obtains ﬁnal keywords by executing the Final Keyword
Selection procedure.
1) System Setup: To perform the one-time setup of CAPIA
system, the user ﬁrst prepares a pre-annotated image dataset
with n images, which can be obtained from public sources,
such as IAPR TC-12 [10], LabelMe [15], etc. For each
image Ii in the dataset, the user extracts seven feature
vectors [Vi,RGB , Vi,HSV , Vi,LAB , Vi,G , Vi,GQ , Vi,H , Vi,HQ ].
Compared with other ﬁve feature vectors that have dimension
up to 256, Vi,H and Vi,HQ have a high dimension as 4096.
To guarantee the efﬁciency while processing feature vectors,
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [16] is utilized to reduce the dimension of Vi,H and Vi,HQ . According to our
experimental evaluation in Section V-B, PCA based dimension
reduction with proper setting can signiﬁcantly improve the
efﬁciency of CAPIA with slight accuracy loss. After that,
L1 normalization will be performed for each feature vector,
which normalizes elements in these vectors to [-1,1]. Besides
Vi,LAB , the user also increases each element in Vi,k , k ∈
{RGB, HSV, G, GQ, H, HQ} as vi,k,j = vi,k,j + 1 to avoid
negative values. Next, each element in all feature vectors
are scaled by the same value. Given three processed vectors
Vi , i ∈ {a, b, c}, it is easy to verify that the sign of L1 distance comparison result DL1ab − DL1ac and KL-Divergence
comparison result DKLab − DKLac with processed vectors
remain the same as that using original vectors. Six feature
vectors that use L1 distance for similarity measurement are
concatenated as a mL1 -dimensional vector Vi,L1 . Vi,LAB is
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denoted as a mKL -dimensional vector Vi,KL for expression
RGB
+
simplicity. It is easy to verify that DL1L1
ab = DL1ab
GQ
HQ
G
H
DL1HSV
+
DL1
+
DL1
+
DL1
+
DL1
.
ab
ab
ab
ab
ab
2) Dataset Encryption: Given an image Ii in the preannotated dataset, its keywords {Ki,t } are ﬁrst encrypted using
AES. Then, feature vectors Vi,L1 and Vi,KL are encrypted as
Ci,L1 and Ci,KL using the Data Encryption methods in our
proposed PL1C and PKLC schemes respectively. During the
encryption, same secret keys SL1 , SKL , public parameter w,
and random number r will be used for all images. However,
different error vector ei and noise term i are generated
for each image Ii correspondingly. The user also computes
STL1 Ss,L1 and STKL Ss,KL , in which Ss,L1 and Ss,KL are secret
keys for the encryption of later annotation requests. These
Ci,L1 , Ci,KL and encrypted keywords of each image Ii , as
well as STL1 Ss,L1 and STKL Ss,KL are outsourced to the cloud.
3) Secure Annotation Request: When the user has a new
image Is for annotation, he/she ﬁrst extracts seven feature vectors as Vs , s ∈ [RGB, HSV, LAB, G, GQ, H, HQ]. These
vectors will be normalized and scaled to output Vs,L1 and
Vs,KL as that in the System Setup procedure. Then, the user
processes and encrypts Vs,L1 and Vs,KL as Cs,L1 and Cs,KL
using the Request Generation methods in our PL1C and PKLC
schemes respectively. For each annotation request, the user
generates a new positive random number rs and a new error
vector es . Cs,L1 and Cs,KL are sent to the cloud as the
annotation request.
4) Privacy-preserving Annotation on Cloud: On receiving the request, the cloud ﬁrst outputs Vi,L1 VTs,L1 and
Vi,KL VTs,KL for each image in the pre-annotated dataset as
Vi,L1 VTs,L1 = vec(STL1 Ss,L1 )

vec(Ci,L1 CTs,L1 )
q
w

Disis = (2r +

m
L1


2
vs,L1,j
)+

j=1

= (2r +

m
L1


2
vs,L1,j
)+

j=1

Compi
rs

−2(Vi,L1 VTs,L1 ) + Vi,KL VTs,KL
rs

To achieve higher accuracy in keywords selection, we consider
that keywords in images that have smaller distance to the
requested one are more relevant. Thus, we deﬁne a real-time
weight Wt for each keyword based on distances Disis as
Disis
W Ii = 1 − 
i∈RST Disis

Wt =
WIi , f or Ii contains Ki,t

(11)
(12)

Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst ﬁgure out the weight WIi of each image
according to their distance based similarity. As our deﬁnition
in Eq.11, images with smaller distance will receive a larger
weight value. Then, considering the same keyword can appear
in multiple images, the ﬁnal weight Wt of a keyword Ki,t
is generated by adding weights of images that contain this
keyword. Finally, the user selects keywords for his/her image
according to their ranking of weight Wt .
D. Security Analysis

(8)

vec(Ci,KL CTs,KL )
q (9)
w
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the cloud ranks all the images
according to their combined distances to the request image
Is . Speciﬁcally, a distance comparison candidate Compi =
−2(Vi,L1 VTs,L1 ) + Vi,KL VTs,KL can be generated for each
image Ii . Given Ia and Ib for example, the cloud can rank
them as
Vi,KL VTs,KL = vec(STKL Ss,KL )

Compa − Compb

distance comparison candidates Compi , i ∈ RST as well as
corresponding encrypted keywords back to the user.
5) Final Keyword Selection: In this stage, the user ﬁrst
decrypts encrypted keywords and obtains Ki,t , i ∈ RST ,
where Ki,t is the t-th pre-annotated keyword in image Ii .
Then, the user computes distances Disis , i ∈ RST as

(10)

= 2(Vb,L1 VTs,L1 − Va,L1 VTs,L1 )
+ Va,L1 VTs,KL − Vb,KL VTs,KL
L1
= rs (DL1L1
as − DL1bs ) + 2(b − a )
+ rs (DKLLAB
− DKLLAB
) + (b − a )
as
bs
= rs (Disas − Disbs ) + 3(b − a )
As rs is a positive value and rs >> (b − a ), the cloud can
ﬁgure out which image is more relative to Is according to the
above distance comparison result. According to the ranking of
all pre-annotated images, the cloud outputs top related images
to Is and denotes them as a set RST. Finally, the cloud returns

In CAPIA, we have the following privacy related data:
feature vectors {Vi,L1 , Vi,KL }1≤i≤n and keywords of image
Ii in the pre-annotated dataset; feature vectors Vs,L1 , Vs,KL of
the image requested for annotation. As keywords are encrypted
using standard AES encryption, we consider them secure
against the cloud server as well as outside adversaries. With
regards to Vi,L1 , Vi,KL , Vs,L1 , Vs,KL , they are encrypted
using the encryption scheme of IVE [12] after pre-processing
as presented in our PL1C and PKLC schemes. The IVE
scheme [12] has been proved to be secure based on the wellknown Learning with Errors (LWE) hard problem [17]. Thus,
given the ciphertexts Ci,L1 , Ci,KL , Cs,L1 , Cs,KL only, it
is computational infeasible for the cloud server or outside
adversaries to recover Vi,L1 , Vi,KL , Vs,L1 , Vs,KL .
1) Security of Outsourcing STL1 Ss,L1 and STKL Ss,KL : As
T
SL1 Ss,L1 and STKL Ss,KL are used in the same manner, we
use ST Ss to denote them for expression simplicity. Different
from the original Encryption algorithm of IVE, the user in
CAPIA also outsources ST Ss to the cloud besides ciphertexts
Ci,L1 , Ci,KL , Cs,L1 , Cs,KL . As all elements in S and Ss are
randomly selected, elements in their multiplication ST Ss have
the same distribution as these elements in S and Ss [18]. Thus,
given ST Ss , the cloud server is not be able to extract S or Ss
directly and use them to decrypt Ci,L1 , Ci,KL , Cs,L1 , Cs,KL .
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By combining ST Ss with ciphertexts Ci,L1 and Cs,L1 (same
as that for Ci,KL and Cs,KL ), the cloud can obtain
ST Ss Ci,L1 = ST Ss S−1 (wVi,L1 + ei )T
T
T
T
ST Ss Cs,L1 = ST Ss S−1
s (wVs,L1 + ei ) = S (wVs,L1 + ei )

From the above two equations, it is clear that the combination
of ST Ss , Ci,L1 and ST Ss , Cs,L1 only transfer them to the
ciphertexts of Vi,L1 and Vs,L1 that encrypted using the IVE
scheme with new keys ST Ss S−1 and ST respectively. As
ST Ss S−1 and ST are random keys and unknown to the cloud,
recovering Vi,L1 , Vs,L1 from ST Ss Ci,L1 , ST Ss Cs,L1 still
become the LW E problem as proved in ref [12]. To this end,
ST Ss only helps the cloud to perform distance comparison
in CAPIA, but does not bring advantages to recover feature
vectors compared with the given ciphertexts only scenario.
2) Known Ciphertext-Image Pairs: We now consider that
the cloud server gets a set of ciphertext-image pairs from
the background analysis as {Vi,L1 , Ci,L1 } ({Vs,L1 , Cs,L1 },
{Vi,KL , Ci,KL }, {Vs,KL , Cs,KL } repsectively). In ref [19], a
linear analysis attack based on ciphertext-image pairs is introduced to recover vectors from their distance comparison result.
In particular, instead of trying to recovering feature vectors or
secret keys directly from ciphertexts, such an attack attempts
to recover the vectors from the distance comparison result by
constructing and solving enough number (i.e., greater than the
dimension of vector) of linear equations. To launch this kind
of linear analysis attack to CAPIA, there are two necessary
requirements that need to be fulﬁlled simultaneously: 1) The
cloud obtains at least m ciphertext-image pairs, where m is
the dimension of feature vectors; 2) The cloud has access to
the exact L1 distance and KL-Divergence comparison results.
As shown in Eq.4 and Eq.7, CAPIA only provides scaled and
obfuscated comparison results by adding noise terms i and
random scaling factor rc . As a result, the cloud cannot fulﬁll
the second requirement to launch a successful linear analysis
attack to CAPIA. To this end, CAPIA is secure even a set of
ciphertext-image pairs are obtained by the cloud server.
3) Request Unlinkability: The request unlinkability in
CAPIA is guaranteed by the randomization for each request.
Speciﬁcally, each query request Vs,L1 , Vs,KL is element-wise
obfuscated with different random error terms es and random
number rs during the encryption, which makes the obfuscated
Vs,L1 , Vs,KL have the same distribution as these random
values in es and rc [18]. Thus, by changing es and rc during
the encryption of different requests, CAPIA outputs different
random ciphertexts, even for requests generated from the same
image.
V. E VALUATION
To evaluate the performance of CAPIA, we implemented
a prototype using Python 2.7. In our implementation, Numpy
[20] is used to support efﬁcient multi-dimension array operations. OpenCV [21] is used to extract the color-space features
of the images and build the ﬁlter kernels to generate the Gabor
ﬁlter results. Pywt [22] is adopted to perform Haar wavelet
and get the corresponding Haar results. Sklearn [23] is used

to perform the PCA transformation. We use the well-known
IAPR TC-12 [24] as the pre-annotated dataset, which contains
20,000 annotated images and the average number of keywords
for each image is 5.7. All tests are performed on a 3.1 GHz
Intel Core i7 Macbook Pro with OS X 10.11.6 installed.
In the rest of this section, n is the total number of images
in the pre-annotated dataset; mL1 and mKL are dimensions
of vectors Vi,L1 and Vi,KL after pre-processing respectively;
P CA − X is used to denote the strength of P CA transformation applied to Vi,H and Vi,HQ in Vi,L1 , which compresses
their dimensions from 4096 to 4096
X . P CA − 128, P CA − 64,
P CA − 32, P CA − 16, and P CA − 8 are evaluated in our
experiments to balance the efﬁciency and accuracy of CAPIA.
We also use DOTm to denote a dot product operation between
to two m-dimensional vectors.
A. System Setup and Dataset Encryption
To perform the one-time setup in CAPIA, the user preprocesses feature vectors of each image in the pre-annotated
image dataset. Speciﬁcally, the user ﬁrst performs JL-Lemma
based approximation over Vi,L1 to make Vi,L1 compatible
with our PL1C. As discussed in Section IV-A, there is a tradeoff between the approximation accuracy of L1 distance and
length of the approximated vector that determines efﬁciency
of follow up privacy-preserving operations. To balance such a
trade-off, we evaluate different parameters for approximation
as shown in Fig.2 (a)-(d). According to our results, we suggest
to set α = 1 and γ = 100 which introduces 3.61% error
rate for L1 distance computation, and extends the dimension
of Vi,L1 from 864 to 1296 under the setting of P CA − 32.
The selection of PCA strength will be discussed and evaluated
in Section V-B. Speciﬁcally, the error rate drops fast when
α < 1 and becomes relative stable when α > 1. Meanwhile,
the dimension of the approximated vector increases linearly
to the value of α. With regard to γ, the dimension of the
approximated vector becomes relative stable when γ > 100,
however, the error rate still increases when γ > 100. As shown
in Fig.3 (a), such an approximation setting makes the preprocessing procedure cost 1471ms to 118ms for each image
with PCA setting from N o P CA to P CA − 128.
After the pre-processing, {Vi,L1 , Vi,KL }1≤i≤n will be encrypted using the Data Encryption procedures of our PL1C
and PKLC schemes respectively. As shown in Eq.3 and
Eq.6, the encryption of each Vi,L1 and Vi,KL requires
(mL1 )DOTmL1 and (mKL )DOTmKL operations respectively.
Fig.3 (a) shows the total encryption cost for Vi,L1 and
Vi,KL of a pre-annotated image decreases from 1436ms to
4.7ms by increasing the strength of PCA from N o P CA to
P CA − 128. This is because the dimension of Vi,L1 , i.e.,
mL1 , is determined by the strength of PCA, which is directly
correlated to the encryption cost of Vi,L1 . Same as the system
setup, encrypting feature vectors is also a one-time cost, which
does not impact the performance of later on real-time privacypreserving image annotation.
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Efﬁciency: To annotate a new image in a privacy-preserving
manner, the user generates an encrypted request by preprocessing and encrypting feature vectors of the requested
image. By varying the PCA strength from N o P CA to
P CA − 128, Fig.3 (b) shows that the request generation
spends from 2775ms to 268ms. On receiving the encrypted
request, the cloud ﬁrst computes distance comparison candidate Compi for each image Ii , 1 ≤ i ≤ n in the pre-annotated
dataset, which requires a (mL1 + 1)DOTmL1 operation and a
(mKL +1)DOTmKL operation as shown in Eq.8 and Eq.9. By
changing the strength of PCA from N o P CA to P CA − 128,
the computational cost for Compi changes from 4334ms to
16.9ms as shown in Fig.3 (c). This is because the dimension
of Vi,L1 , i.e., mL1 , is determined by the strength of PCA
and mL1 >> mKL (e.g., 1298 v.s. 98 in P CA − 32).
Afterwards, the cloud selects encrypted keywords according
the ranking of Compi as Eq.10. It is worth to note that
the annotation process on cloud can be easily parallelized
for performance optimization. In particular, computation of
Compi for different pre-annotated images are independent
with each other, and thus can be easily parallelized in the
cloud computing environment.
Accuracy: We now evaluate the accuracy of CAPIA. In our
evaluation, we use the standard average precision and recall
rates to measure the accuracy of keywords annotation as that
in automatic annotation using plaintext images. We use 50
images as annotation requests, and each image will be assigned
ten keywords after automatic annotation. Each request has two
or more related images in the pre-annotated dataset. We use set
[K1 , K2 , · · · , Kx ] to denote distinct keywords annotated for
all 50 requested images. The annotation precision and recall
rate for a keyword Kj , 1 ≤ j ≤ x in these 50 requests are

deﬁned as
• precisionKj : number of images assigned Kj correctly in
CAPIA divided by the total number of images assigned
Kj in CAPIA.
• recallKj : number of images assigned Kj correctly in
CAPIA divided by the number of images assigned Kj
in the ground-truth annotation.
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To compare the annotation accuracy of CAPIA, we also
evaluate the no-privacy-preserving annotation using the same
50 requests. As shown in Fig.4 and Fig.5, while providing
strong privacy guarantee, CAPIA introduces less than 2.5%
and 7.5% accuracy loss in terms of average precision and
recall rates with PCA setting from N o P CA to P CA−128. In
addition, Fig.4 and Fig.5 also demonstrate that the increasing
of PCA strength reduces the annotation accuracy of CAPIA to
some extent, especially from P CA − 32 to P CA − 64. Taking
the efﬁciency enhancement brought by PCA together into
consideration, we suggest to use P CA − 32 as an appropriate
setting for practical usage. Speciﬁcally, Fig.3 demonstrates
the efﬁciency improvement from PCA becomes relative stable
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cost for a request is 26KB. Meanwhile, the returned result
contains encrypted keywords and distance comparison candidates Compi of top 10 related images. Using AES-256 for
keywords encryption, the total size for the returned result is
488 Bytes with the average number of keywords for each preannotated image as 5.7. With regard to the storage overhead
of CAPIA, it includes two parts for each pre-annotated image
Ii : 1) encrypted feature vectors Ci.L1 and Ci.KL , which are
26KB in total. 2) Encrypted keywords, which are 480 Bytes
as average using AES-256 encryption.
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Fig. 5. Recall of CAPIA and Annotation without Encryption

after P CA − 32. Meanwhile, the accuracy loss of CAPIA still
increases quickly after P CA − 32.
In Table I, we present samples of automatically annotated
images using CAPIA. On one hand, CAPIA is highly possible
to assign correct keywords to images compared with human
annotation. This observation also conﬁrms the high average
recall rate of CAPIA, since these ground-truth annotations are
likely to be covered in CAPIA. On the other hand, CAPIA
also introduces additional keywords that frequently appear
together with these accurate keywords in top related images.
These additional keywords are typically not directly included
in human annotations, but are potentially related to correct
keywords. Such a fact also explains why the average precision
rate of CAPIA is relatively low compared with the average
recall rate. Overall, our evaluation results demonstrate that
although CAPIA cannot provide perfect keywords selection
all the time compared with human annotation, it is still
promising for automatically assigning keywords to images,
and hence fulﬁlling the fundamental gap between SE schemes
and images.
Image

CAPIA Annotation

Human Annotation

ﬂoor-tennis-court,
man, woman

ﬂoor-tennis-count,
man

sky-blue, highway,
vegetation, ground, bush,
trees, lake, ocean
cloud, sky-blue,
ground, mountain, horse,
man, road, grass
group-of-persons, sky-blue,
ground, trees, mountain,
ruin-archeological, hat,
cloud, hill

highway, sky-blue,
trees, vegetation
ground, cloud,
sky-blue, mountain,
snow, grass
trees, ground, man,
sky-blue, group-of-persons

TABLE I
S AMPLE A NNOTATION R ESULTS

C. Communication Cost and Storage Overhead
The communication cost in CAPIA comes from two major
parts: annotation request and encrypted results returned from
the cloud server. The encrypted request consists of a mL1 dimensional vector Cs.L1 and a mKL -dimensional vector
Cs.KL . In the P CA − 32 setting, the total communication

VI. R ELATED W ORKS
To solve the problem of how to search over encrypted
data, the idea of keywords-based searchable encryption (SE)
was ﬁrst introduced by Song et.al in ref [4]. Later on, with
the widespread use of cloud storage services, the idea of SE
received increasing attention from researchers. In ref [5], [6],
search efﬁciency enhanced SE schemes are proposed based on
novel index constructions. After that, SE with the support of
multiple keywords and conjunctive keywords are investigated
in ref [7], [8], and thus making the search more accurate and
ﬂexible. Recently, fuzzy keyword is considered in ref [9],
which enables SE schemes to tolerate misspelled keyword
during the search process. While these SE schemes offer
decent features for keywords-based search, their application
to images are limited given the question that how keywords
of images can be efﬁciently extracted with privacy protection.
It is impractical for cloud storage users to manually annotate
their images. To automate the keywords extraction process
for images, a number of research works have been proposed
with the concept of “automatic image annotation” [11], [25]–
[27]. In automatic image annotation, keywords of a new image
can be learned from a large-scale images that have already
been annotated. Nowadays, mobile devices have become the
major platform for taking and outsourcing images, however,
deploying automatic image annotation with large-scale image
datasets on mobile devices is clearly inefﬁcient in terms of
energy, storage, and computation. Although outsourcing image
annotation tasks to public cloud servers is a potential solution
to release the burden of resource constrained mobile devices, it
also raises privacy issues since unencrypted images need to be
delegated to the cloud. Therefore, this paper proposes CAPIA,
which utilizes the power of cloud computing to perform
automatic image annotation for users, while only providing
encrypted image information to the cloud.
Another line of research that is related to this work
is privacy-preserving image retrieval [28]–[31]. While these
schemes also investigate similarity measurement between images, none of them considers how to transfer keywords to new
images. In addition, these existing privacy-preserving image
retrieval schemes [28]–[30] are designed based on powerful
but expensive homomophic encryption schemes, which require
frequent user (or a fully trusted key agent) involvement during
the image similarity measurement process. Differently, CAPIA
enables the user to fully outsource the privacy-preserving
image similarity measurement task to the cloud without any
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interaction. In ref [31], the performance of privacy-preserving
image similarity measurement has been greatly enhanced
on both user side and cloud server side. Unfortunately, the
security of this scheme against the linear analysis attack
[19] is based on the assumption that PCA transformation
parameters cannot be learned by the cloud server. In CAPIA,
such an assumption is not necessary thanks to our design based
on the LWE hard problem and our approximated distance
comparison.
VII. C ONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a cloud assisted privacypreserving automatic image annotation scheme (CAPIA),
which supports efﬁcient and accurate keywords extraction. In
CAPIA, lightweight privacy-preserving L1 distance (PL1C)
and KL-Divergence (PKLC) comparison schemes are carefully designed, which enable key steps of automatic image
annotation to be performed in a privacy-preserving manner.
Our PL1C and PKLC schemes can also utilized as independent tools for other related ﬁelds, especially for similarity
measurement of data. To improve the annotation accuracy,
we also investigate a real-time weight design and integrate
it into CAPIA. Thorough security analysis is provided to
demonstrate that CAPIA is secure in the deﬁned threat model.
Our prototype implementation over the well-known IAPR TC12 dataset validates the practical performance of CAPIA in
terms of computational cost, communication cost, storage cost,
and accuracy.
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